This paper explores the issue of whether strict liability imposed on polluters has served to reduce uncontrolled releases of toxics into the environment. Strict liability should create additional incentives for firms to handle hazardous substances more carefully, thus reducing the future likelihood of uncontrolled releases of toxics. However, the size of these incentives may vary according to the size of a firm's assets, since asset size is the ultimate limit on a firm's liability. We are therefore interested to see whether imposing strict liability for the cost of remediation at hazardous waste sites has encouraged firms to handle toxic materials more carefully and has uniformly reduced the incidence of toxic spills, or whether the effect is dependent on firm size and other factors.
Abstract
This paper explores the issue of whether strict liability imposed on polluters has served to reduce uncontrolled releases of toxics into the environment. Strict liability should create additional incentives for firms to handle hazardous substances more carefully, thus reducing the future likelihood of uncontrolled releases of toxics. However, the size of these incentives may vary according to the size of a firm's assets, since asset size is the ultimate limit on a firm's liability. We are therefore interested to see whether imposing strict liability for the cost of remediation at hazardous waste sites has encouraged firms to handle toxic materials more carefully and has uniformly reduced the incidence of toxic spills, or whether the effect is dependent on firm size and other factors.
To answer these questions, we exploit the variation in state hazardous waste site laws across states and over time. We use data on accidents and spills involving hazardous substances coming from a comprehensive database of events reported to the US EPA under their Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS), and fit regressions relating the frequency of spills of selected chemicals used in manufacturing to the type of liability in force in a state. We control for the extent of manufacturing activity in the state, and include in the regression other program features that might alter firms' expected outlays in the event of an accident, and thus affect firms' incentives to take care.
Results vary with the chemical being analyzed. For some chemicals, such as halogenated solvents, the presence of strict liability does not provide any additional explanatory power for the number of spills beyond what is achieved by the number of establishments and the sectoral composition of manufacturing. For other families of chemicals (acids, ammonia and chlorine), we find that the impacts of manufacturing activities on the number of spills in each state do vary systematically with the liability regime. In particular, it appears that under strict liability small firms are responsible for a disproportionate number of spills. Since strict liability states tend to have more manufacturing firms, and more small manufacturing firms, these factors serve to increase the number of spills of these chemicals in strict liability states.
Strict Liability as a Deterrent in Toxic Waste Management:
Empirical Evidence from Accident and Spill Data.
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the issue of whether strict liability imposed on polluters has served to reduce uncontrolled releases of toxics into the environment.
Because it imposes pollution damages upon the polluter, strict liability should create additional incentives for firms to handle hazardous substances more carefully, thus reducing the future likelihood of such uncontrolled releases.
Provisions making polluters liable for the damages caused by their polluting activities have, in fact, been incorporated into a number of federal and state environmental laws passed over the last two decades. For instance, the federal program commonly known as Superfund (CERCLA, 1980; re-authorized in 1986 and further extended in 1991 1 ) and the hazardous waste cleanup laws of many states hold those parties that have contributed to forming high-risk hazardous waste sites liable for the costs of cleanup.
Similarly, the Offshore Continental Shelf Act (1974) imposes strict liability on oil companies for damages from off-shore spills occurring during drilling operations, and requires use of the best available technologies to ensure safe drilling.
It has been argued that liability law is an important and promising policy tool for dealing with pollution problems (Tietenberg, 1989) . Economic theory, however, is ambivalent about its effects. Firms with relatively limited assets may be sheltered from the economic incentives created by strict liability (Shavell, 1984; Tietenberg, 1989) . Beard (1990) and Larson (1996) find that the effect of imposing strict liability remains, at best, uncertain. They dispel the notion that under strict liability the level of care taken by a firm to prevent accidental releases is always increasing in firm wealth, and conclude that large, wealthy firms may or may not be safer than smaller ones.
Firms may even select their asset level or corporate financial structure to minimize payment of damages in the event of an accident (Pitchford, 1995) . Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) provide evidence that imposition of strict liability may have in fact encouraged wealthier firms to spin off into, or subcontract risky operations to, smaller, judgmentproof companies in hopes of avoiding liability. 2 Finally, the incentives created by liability can be altered by the availability and cost of pollution insurance.
In light of the many possible effects of imposing liability on polluters, it is rather surprising that so little empirical work has been done to date to examine firms' actual responses to environmental liability law. Opaluch and Grigalunas (1984) present evidence that bids for tracts on the Outer Continental Shelf do reflect the environmental risks perceived by firms under the Offshore Continental Shelf Act, but we are not aware of any 2 Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) deal with occupational safety. They find that entry of small manufacturing companies has been particularly pronounced into industrial sectors with high potential liability for workers' long-term health effects from toxic exposures. This suggests that regulations, dating from the 1970s, that make firms liable for such adverse health effects have resulted in large companies delegating operations bearing toxics risks to smaller, judgment-proof companies.
empirical studies examining the role of liability as a deterrent to uncontrolled releases of toxics into the environment.
In this paper, we set out to explore this issue, focusing specifically on firm liability for the cost of remediation at hazardous waste sites. Under the Federal Superfund law, certain parties -including waste generators and transporters, and operators of waste sites -are held responsible for any cleanup costs at high-risk toxic waste sites, without requiring proof they acted negligently or with intent (Fogleman, 1992) . 3 In addition, many states have established their own cleanup programs, with authorities and capabilities similar to those of the federal Superfund program. These state cleanup programs were authorized within a few years after the passage of the federal Superfund, in order to address the numerous sites which are not included on the National Priority List (NPL), and so do not qualify for federally financed remediation (Barnett, 1994) . 4 Their specific provisions, including the imposition of strict liability, vary across states, and many have evolved considerably since the program's inception. These differences, across states and over time, provide us with a natural experiment for assessing strict liability's effects on the handling of toxics.
We use data on accidents and spills involving hazardous substances to establish whether their frequency of occurrence has been systematically affected by the introduction of strict liability. The data come from a comprehensive database of events reported to the US EPA under their Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS). Because ERNS 3 The courts have interpreted Superfund as imposing joint and several liability, which holds all potentially responsible parties liable for the entire amount of the cleanup when it is not possible to determine their individual contributions. 4 The state mini-superfund programs also contain provisions for the funding of the state's share of the cost of cleanup at NPL sites. Such share is mandated by CERCLA.
begins in 1987, we are unable to establish whether the passage of the federal Superfund law has affected the occurrence of accidental releases. Instead, we examine whether the strict liability feature of state cleanup programs has had any additional influence on the number of accidental events, above and beyond that of the federal Superfund. In particular, we care to see whether the effect of strict liability on firms' handling of toxic materials has been uniformly to reduce the incidence of toxic spills, or whether its effect is dependent on firm size and other factors.
To study this relationship, we estimate regressions relating the frequency of spills of selected chemicals used in manufacturing to the type of liability in force in a state. We control for the extent of manufacturing activity in the state, and include in the regression other program features that might alter firms' expected outlays in the event of an accident, and thus affect firms' incentives to take care.
Results vary with the chemical being analyzed. For some chemicals, such as halogenated solvents, the presence of strict liability does not provide any additional explanatory power for the number of spills beyond what is achieved by the number of establishments and the sectoral composition of manufacturing. For other families of chemicals (acids, ammonia and chlorine), we find that the impacts of manufacturing activities on the number of spills in each state do vary systematically with the liability regime. In particular, it appears that under strict liability small firms are responsible for a larger share of spills. Since strict liability states tend to have more manufacturing firms and more small manufacturing firms, these factors serve to increase the number of spills of these chemicals in strict liability states.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents theoretical considerations.
Section 3 describes our data on accidental releases of toxics. Section 4 discusses the state mini-superfund programs. The econometric model, the variables and the regression strategy are presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical considerations
To provide a framework for our empirical work, this section we examine models of firms' optimal levels of care against uncontrolled releases of pollutants into the environment. Shavell (1984) considers a firm that, at some cost x, can reduce its likelihood of an accident. When an accident occurs, damages are $D, which is fixed for a given firm, but varies across firms. The regulator knows only the distribution of D over the firms, but not the firm-specific level of D. Shavell shows that --if the harm caused by some parties can exceed their assets, or if some parties can escape legal judgement --the level of care taken by a firm under strict liability is less than the socially optimal level. Under strict liability the level of care, and hence the likelihood of an accident, should, therefore, depend on the firm's total potential liability, D; 5 on its wealth, W; and on the probability of a suit, p. The firm's level of care increases with the size of the potential damages D it faces, but only so long as D is less than the wealth of the firm. 5 D includes, in the case of remediation at hazardous waste sites, cleanup costs, compensation to victims, and punitive damages (if prescribed by law). 6 Shavell goes on to compare ex post liability with regulation, showing that liability can be superior to regulation when the likelihood of a suit is high, firms' assets are large relative to damages, or there is heterogeneity across firms in the size of potential damages they face. Joint use of regulation and liability can induce levels of care better than those chosen by firms under regulation or liability regimes alone.
Other models, such as those developed by Beard (1990) and Larson (1996) , do not necessarily support this hypothesis. Beard (1990) allows the size of the damages from an accident to be random. While the probability of an accident is influenced by a firm's level of care, in this model the distribution of the size of the damages is not. As in Shavell's model, if the damages exceed the assets of the firms, disbursements are virtually "truncated" by bankruptcy. This makes the private benefits of care lower than the social benefits, and the private costs of care lower than the social costs. In Beard's model, firms subject to strict liability may either over-or under-invest in care relative to the socially optimally level, depending on the distribution of accident size, and wealthy firms may not necessarily invest in more care than smaller firms. Larson (1996) considers firms facing uncertainty about their profits in addition to uncertainty about accidental releases. Firms choose between allocating resources to production involving toxics and to riskless investments. Firms' level of care is shown to be increasing in wealth only for firms operating in "extremely hazardous" sectors (where an accident would always put the firm out of business).
Taken together, the Beard and Larson models suggest that whether the liability regime and other factors increase or decrease the likelihood of accidents remains an empirical issue, and that no prior expectations can be formed on the direction of the effects of W and D on the likelihood of accidental events.
When strict liability is compared with negligence-based liability, the difference in the level of care taken by a firm under the two alternative regimes may depend on W, D, p, and on x , the negligence standard established by the courts (Tietenberg, 1989) .
Formally, the difference in accident probabilities between strict liability and a negligencebased liability regime can be expressed as:
(1) (P N -P S ) = f(D, W, x , p; I)
where P I denotes the probability of an accidental release of toxics under regime I, I ∈ {N(egligence), S(trict)}. Equation (1) informs our empirical analyses by suggesting that in addition to I, we must control for W, D, x , and p.
None of the models here reviewed explicitly considers the possibility that a firm might purchase insurance against accidental releases of toxics. Firms may become insensitive to the imposition of strict liability to the extent they can purchase pollution insurance, but the insurance industry would likely respond by rationing insurance, requiring proof of care against accidents by firms, and making premia very expensive.
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In this paper, we explore the empirical issue of how strict liability has affected the level of care taken by firms to prevent unintended releases of pollutants into the environment. We examine the ultimate outcome of care, focusing on sudden and accidental releases that occurred over a relatively recent time period. Datasets documenting individual spill events are publicly available, but in most cases do not contain 7 Some observers have indeed argued in favor of requiring hazardous waste generators and haulers, and operators of commercial hazardous waste facilities, to purchase insurance against accidental releases of pollutants into the environment, while maintaining either negligence-based or strict liability. The idea behind this proposal is that the insurance industry would require appropriate safety measures on the part of potential polluters. Whether insurance is mandatory or optional, insurance companies are likely to respond by rationing the provision of insurance (Hanley, Shogren and White, 1997) . Until the 1970s, comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies covered the risk of environmental liabilities, provided that releases of pollutants were sudden and accidental. At present, however, CGL policies contain absolute pollution exclusions. Insurers write "specialized environmental impairment liability policies", but these are hard to obtain and very costly (King, 1988 We were initially interested in estimating joint models of the quantity of chemicals released and the number of releases. We were concerned that strict liability would have affected the severity of spills, as well as their number. We found, however, that for many substance or a CERCLA hazardous substance (one pound or more, unless otherwise specified by regulation) resulting in exposure of people outside the boundary of the facility where the release occurs be reported to the State and local authorities. HMTA requires that the release of a DOT hazardous material during transportation be reported to the National Response Center under certain circumstances, such as death, injury, significant property damage, evacuation, highway closure, etc. Finally, the Clean Water Act requires that the release of oil be reported to the National Response Center if the release: (1) violates applicable quality standards; (2) causes a film, sheen or discoloration of the water or adjoining shoreline; or (3) causes a sludge or an emulsion to be deposited beneath the surface of the water or upon the adjoining shoreline. 11 Wentz (1989) recognizes three types of accidents. The first type is generally infrequent, but has catastrophic consequences. An example is the 1984 Bhopal chemical disaster. The second type occurs relatively more frequently, but is still rare, involves fires or explosions in warehouses or chemical transport, and will almost always involve some deaths. The third type does not result in deaths, involves lower level releases, is much more frequent than the other types, and can have cumulative effects on the people affected and the environment. As explained below, the spill events we analyze in this paper consist exclusively of accidents of the second type (very few) and of the third type (very numerous).
spills the quantity released data are missing or set to zero for lack of better information, making total quantities systematically under-reported. Accordingly, in this paper we analyze the determinants of the number of spills per year in each state, from the beginning of 1987 to the end of 1995.
Since our data are aggregated to the number of spills and accidents per state per year, we need a way of controlling for differing patterns in the way various chemicals are used in manufacturing. These patterns may influence the seriousness of the damages from the spills. We control for differences in how each chemical is used by organizing our analyses along more or less narrow chemical divisions. This approach also has the advantage of controlling for differences in the ways such substances may be regulated, and in ERNS reporting requirements.
Specifically, we focus on spills involving selected substances or groups of relatively similar, highly toxic, CERCLA-regulated substances used in manufacturing: (1) acids; (2) chlorine and chlorine dioxide; (3) anhydrous ammonia; (4) four halogenated solvents: methylene chloride (METH), perchloroethylene (PERC), trichloroethylene (TCE), and 1,1,1-or 1,1,2-trichloroethane (TCA); and (5) 
State mini-superfund programs.
Since the early 1980s, many states have enacted laws and developed programs similar to the federal Superfund program, providing for emergency response actions and long-term remediation at hazardous waste sites. These statutes often establish a financing mechanism to pay for initial feasibility studies and remediation activities, spell out the conditions under which monies from such funds are to be used, and contain provisions conferring authority to force responsible parties to conduct feasibility studies and cleanups, and/or pay for them (EPA, 1989 (EPA, , 1990 (EPA, , 1991 ELI, 1993 ELI, , 1995 .
By 1989, thirty-nine states had created such funding and enforcement authorities.
This number had climbed to 45 by 1995, as shown in Figure 2 . The five states without separate mini-superfund programs addressed hazardous waste issues using other regulations.
One important difference between the Federal Superfund program and many state mini-superfund programs lies in the liability standards imposed on the responsible parties:
Liability under the federal Superfund is strict, joint and several, but this is not necessarily the case for many of the state programs. As of 1987, only twenty-seven states had instituted strict liability; by 1995 this number had climbed to forty.
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The state mini-superfund programs may enable states to initiate cleanup when the responsible parties are uncooperative, and to seek to recover cleanup costs from them.
State mini-superfund laws may also include provisions allowing private citizens, as opposed to government agencies, to file civil actions requiring that the responsible party prevent further damage or take corrective action if citizens have been adversely affected.
In some states (15 in 1995) responsible parties must compensate those who are affected by the release of the toxic substances. Compensation is usually limited to paying for alternative drinking water supplies or for temporary relocation.
Regression models.
To check whether a state's liability structure influences the frequency of accidents, we exploit differences in the provisions of the various state mini-superfund programs. In For spills of acids and ammonia, we estimate the regression equations:
where y is the number of accidental releases of these chemicals in state i in year t. The vector x contains factors that are thought to be predictors of the number of spills and that proxy for the elements in equation (1). β is a vector of parameters and ε is an i.i.d. error not joint-and-several, liability, was 6, while states with both strict and joint-and-several liability numbered to 34.
term. There are 51 "states" in the analysis, including the District of Columbia; the year ranges between 1987 and 1995.
For the chlorine/chlorine dioxide and halogenated solvents families, there are far fewer spills (see Table 1 ), and many states have no spills in a given year. To handle this, we fit Poisson regression models, estimated by maximum likelihood. These regressions assume that the probability of experiencing y spills in year t is: 
The Choice of Independent Variables
How a firm responds to the imposition of liability should depend, among other things, on its ability to deflect payment of some or all of the damages to its insurance companies. Aggregate spills rates should, therefore, depend on how insurers react to firms' demand for pollution insurance.
Ideally, we would like to account for these effects by specifying a system of two simultaneous equations, in which the dependent variables are (i) the number of spills, and
(ii) the extent of pollution insurance purchased by firms. Unfortunately, data on pollution insurance purchased by firms, and claims paid to firms in relation to spills and contaminated sites, are not available. 18 This forces us to focus on single, reduced-form equations for spill counts (equations (2) and (3)), in which the right-hand side variables are exogenous factors influencing care, and hence spills, directly, or through the demand and supply for pollution insurance.
The variables x, therefore, include measures of the state's economic and manufacturing activities; hazardous waste generation per capita; population characteristics (density, membership in environmental organizations); and program characteristics (indicators of presence of provisions for victim compensation, citizen suit, punitive damages, strict liability).
The number of toxic spills should depend on the extent of economic activity relying on chemicals. We capture this, and the breakdown of industrial activity into wealthy and less wealthy firms, by using the numbers of production units in the industrial and extractive sectors in the state, both at the aggregate level and broken down into "large" and "small" plants. We are forced to use the number of employees to define small and large establishments, since data on the number of firms by asset size are not available at the state level. In this paper, we report results obtained by defining small establishments (1987) . The survey revealed that in 1985 specialized pollution insurance made up only 0.5% of total premium paid for property/casualty insurance, and that median claim paid out to the insured was of approximately $5000. Lack of insurance availaibility for TSDFs was particularly hard on landfills and surface impoundments, which are required by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to carry insurance for non-sudden accidental releases (such as leaks of leachate into soil and groundwater). Insurance for generators of hazardous wastes and toxics was also hard to find. Insurers interviewed as part of the GAO study asserted that "CERCLA's standards of liability not only have reduced the availability of pollution insurance, but also have affected the standard of care owed by generators, transporters, and owners/operators of TSDFs." They further maintained that "liability standards undermine these parties' incentives to exercise due care to prevent pollution because the standard of care is not related to the potential for liability." According to the report, this view contrasts sharply with the opinion expressed by other parties, such as an official of the largest commercial waste disposal company who thought that "the standards of liability have in fact increased the standard of care taken by the industry."
as those with fewer than 20 employees. 19 We take log transformations of these variables to allow for the number of spills to grow at either a decreasing or an increasing rate with the number of firms.
To capture damages D, which are not observed directly, we create a pair of indicator variables, VICTCOMP and PUNDAMAGE, for, respectively, the presence of provisions for victim compensation in the state mini-superfund program, and for whether a state initiating cleanup in the presence of recalcitrant responsible parties may impose punitive damages.
To account for the probability p of being targeted by the agency, we construct a dummy (CITSUIT) for whether private citizens can initiate actions against parties responsible for toxic releases. We treat this provision as an effective broadening of the reach of the state environmental agency, because it increases the ability of private citizens to serve as "deputies" for the agency, possibly permitting closer oversight over firm behavior than the agency could achieve by itself.
The regressor at the heart of this paper is, of course, STRICT, our indicator for whether the mini-superfund program prescribes strict liability. We note that STRICT could also influence firms' perceived probabilities of being targeted by the agency. In the absence of strict liability, the agency may have only limited control over potentially responsible parties, possibly giving firms less incentive to take care, with the result that there may be more -or more severe -spills. State laws interpreted to impose strict 19 Although establishments with fewer than 20 employees account for only about two percent of the total value of shipments from manufacturing firms, they are very numerous, making up about two-thirds of the total number of establishments. We repeated our analyses for other breakdowns into smaller and larger establishments (e.g., establishments with fewer and more than 50 or 100 employees), and obtained qualitatively similar results. To control for possible differences in state propensities to report spills to ERNS, we include in the regression model two variables that we believe influence the reporting of spills: population density (accidents may be more difficult to conceal in highly populated places), and membership, per 1000 residents, in either of three major environmental organizations (environmental awareness of the population may affect the level of scrutiny and reporting). However, population density may also influence the extent and cost, of cleanup, and may encorage firms to avoid releases for fear that they will be reported to authorities by community residents, making the sign of the coefficient of population density unknown a priori. Similar considerations apply to the sign of the coefficient of ENVORG. Finally, we include among the regressors the amount of hazardous waste per capita generated in the state. After establishing these relationships, we attempt to control for the composition of manufacturing in each state over several key industrial sectors. We reason that the presence of strict liability may have caused the relocation of certain types of production operations that tend to result in a larger number of spills. This might be the effect if adoption of strict liability were to cause larger firms to migrate out of state or to spin off small, more "judgment-proof" subsidiaries to handle their risky lines of business in-state.
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20 Under negligence-based liability, it is up to the courts to establish the applicable standard of negligence. 22 We present a simple test of endogeneity of strict liability in Appendix B. 23 Data limitations prevent us from accounting for particular production processes beyond the numbers of establishments in certain industries.
To see if behavioral responses of firms are structurally different under the two alternative liability regimes, we then run separate regressions for states and years with and without strict liability. T statistics in parentheses. Poisson regression: misspecification-consistent t statistics. T statistics in parentheses. Poisson regression: misspecification-consistent t statistics.
Results.

A. Initial regressions
As shown in Table 2 , the number of spills a state experiences in a year is generally well predicted by the numbers of manufacturing and mining establishments located there, the amount of hazardous waste generated in the state, the degree of environmental awareness of the public, population density, and the policy dummies. Jointly considered, these regressors are significant predictors of the numbers of spills at conventional significance levels and explain a reasonable portion of the variability in the dependent variable. The adjusted R squares in the models for acid and ammonia spills are 67 and 49 percent, respectively.
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Looking at the results for the attributes of the state mini-superfund programs ( Table 2 , regressions A), we find that the coefficient of strict liability is positive and significant: states that adopt strict liability continue to have higher rates of toxic spills.
Further controlling for prosecutorial discretion of the state agency and likely outcome of litigation through the state court system (regressions B) does not change this result. The effect is robust across different chemical families and specifications, and can be quite large.
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The effects of other attributes of the state programs appear to vary with the specification and with the chemical being analyzed: the presence of punitive damages provisions, for instance, is not a significant determinant of the number of spills involving acids, but has a strong, negative effect on the number of spills of TCA, TCE, METH and PERC, at least in specification (A). Excluding the dummy variables that capture the other aspects of the state programs generally does not change much the coefficients of strict liability, nor their statistical significance.
To find whether the number of small and large establishments have different effects on spills, we performed F tests (for ammonia and acid spills) and likelihood ratio tests (for 24 For the Poisson regressions, we compute the t statistics based on misspecification-robust standard errors. The misspecification robust covariance matrix is (F -1 V F -1 ), where V is the Fisher information matrix for the Poisson model, and F is the expected value of the outer product of the score, the score being the vector of first derivatives of the model (see Fahrmeir and Tutz, 1994) . 25 The regressions using the broad halogenated solvents data suggest that the number of spills of these chemicals are up to 200% greater in strict liability states than what would be predicted by the other independent variables alone.
the Poisson models) of the null hypothesis that, in each equation A of Table 2 , the coefficients of large firms are equal to their small-firm counterparts.
We obtained mixed results: the null hypothesis of equal small-and large-firm effects is rejected for spills of acids, chlorine, and the broader halogenated solvent family.
For these families, the number of small firms is positively and significantly associated with the number of accidents, but the number of large firms is not. The contributions of small and large firms to the frequency of ammonia spills and of the subset of four halogenated solvents is not statistically different.
The coefficients of population density and membership in leading environmental organizations frequently switch sign from one regression to the next, probably as a result of the moderate, but significant, correlation between these variables.
The quantity of hazardous waste generated per resident is almost always significantly and positively related to the frequency of spills. With values ranging from 0.04 to 0.12, however, the effect of HAZWASTE, which serves as a control for the amount of activity involving substances actually classified as toxic waste, is not very large.
Adding variables that account for the aggressiveness of the state in forcing responsible parties to pay for cleanup, and expected outcome of litigation over responsibility at contaminated sites (regressions B) does not alter the basic results about the sign and magnitude of the coefficient of strict liability. F tests (for the linear regressions) and W tests (for the Poisson regressions) indicate that these variables as whole significantly improve the fit of the model. In most regressions, LAWYER3 and CORTEFF have the expected negative coefficients, but t statistics indicate that the coefficients are for the most part insignificant at the conventional levels. PCTDEMPR has a strong and negative effect on the number of spills.
Regression results from controlling for the composition of production activities are reported in Table 3 . We control for the composition of manufacturing in the state by including as explanatory variables the logs of the numbers of plants in industries that are major users of the chemicals. For instance, we predict annual chlorine gas and chlorine dioxide spills using the numbers of chemical plants (chlorine being a feedstock for other intermediate and finished chemical products), paper and allied products plants, food processing establishments, and textiles plants, all of which use these substances for bleaching purposes. 26 Similarly, chlorinated solvents are used as a chemical feedstock, for metal cleaning purposes in manufacturing, and in the furniture and plastics industries.
Although widely used for dry cleaning and in the service/repair industry, we do not try to explicitly control for the businesses in the latter sectors: population density should capture their numbers.
In general, this improves the predictive power of the models, but has a mixed effect on the strict liability dummy.
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For spills involving halogenated solvents, the coefficient of the strict liability dummy becomes insignificant. One possible explanation for this finding is that the presence of other environmental regulations overwhelms the incentives posed by liability. But when we included state regulations and standards for emissions of halogenated solvents (reported in Sigman, 1996) , we found no evidence of a 26 For ammonia and chlorine spills, strict liability continues to be positively and significantly associated with the number of spills, over and above what is predicted by the amount of manufacturing in the various industries. Hence, we focus on these chemicals, as well as on acids spills, in our next analyses.
B. Interpreting results
That the presence of strict liability is a positive and significant predictor of spills is consistent with several possible explanations.
First, the effect could be real: strict liability could give firms fewer incentives to take care than a negligence standard. Second, the estimated coefficient of strict liability may capture the effects of other omitted factors correlated with the number of spills. To account for unobserved heterogeneity, we re-estimate our models using fixed effects techniques.
Third, it is possible that the strict liability dummy captures a heightened reporting effect on the part of both firms and authorities -that states which have adopted strict liability are populated by individuals, firms and government officials with a higher 28 Excluding these other attributes makes the strict liability dummy negative, but insignificant. 29 The coefficients of the variables measuring the number of firms in the various manufacturing sectors often have counterintuitive signs in the halogenated solvents equations of table 3. We blame this result to the high degree of collinearity between those regressors: the coefficient of correlation between counts of plants varies between 0.83 and 0.94. When we go beyond controlling for manufacturing composition, to also include firm size, there is little effect on the predictive power of our regression models, and the sign, magnitude and significance of the coefficient of the strict liability dummy does not change much.
propensity to report spills. Fourth, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the strict liability dummy may be an artifact of the econometric specification. For instance, if the true coefficients of the major variables in the model -not only firm and state size variables, but also the other characteristics of states' cleanup programs -differ across states that do and do not have strict liability provisions, imposing that they be equal may result in biased estimates.
Formal testing of the third and fourth explanations requires that we split the data into two separate sets, and fit separate regressions for observations from states and years with and without strict liability hazardous waste laws. Based on these separate regressions, we perform two Wald tests. The first is a test of the "reporting effect", the null hypothesis of which is that the coefficients of ENVORG and population density are equal across the two regimes. Rejecting this null hypothesis would imply that at least part of the differences in spills rate between the two liability regimes are due to reporting effects.
The second Wald test seeks evidence that under strict liability small plants contribute disproportionately to the number of spills -as would be the case if, for example, strict liability resulted in risky operations being shifted to smaller firms. The null hypothesis of the second Wald test is, therefore, that the variables measuring small plant effects and those measuring large plant effects have equal coefficients under the two regimes. T statistics in parentheses. Poisson regressions: misspecification-consistent t statistics.
C. Unobserved heterogeneity
It is possible that spills counts are influenced by unobserved state characteristics that persist over time. To account for unobserved heterogeneity in our data, we re-specify our regression equations to include fixed effects. In the case of acids and ammonia, the model becomes:
where the αs are state-specific intercepts, and x includes only time-varying regressors.
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Results from the fixed effects models for acid and ammonia spills are reported in table 4. Although an F test supports the fixed effects model as opposed to a model with a common intercept, and a hausman test supports the fixed effects model over the random effects model, it is hard to make out much from the fixed effects model for acid spills. All coefficients are insignificant, including that of strict liability, which is negative.
The fixed effects model is better behaved for ammonia spills. In this model, four coefficients are individually significant at the 10 percent level or better: the coefficients of small manufacturing plants, the citizen suit dummy, lawyers per million residents, and PCTDEMPR. In contrast with other regressions, the latter variables has a positive coefficient. The coefficient of strict liability is now negative and insignificant, suggesting that -only for ammonia spills -perhaps some of the earlier results about strict liability may have been partly due to neglecting unobserved heterogeneity. 30 Fixed effects techniques cannot identify the coefficients of variables that vary only across states. By contrast, another widely used unobserved heterogeneity model, the random effects model, produces estimates of the coefficients of both time-varying and time-invariant regressors. The advantage of the fixed effects model over the random effects model is that the former does not require that the state-specific intercepts be independent of the included regressors, whereas consistency of the GLS estimates of the coefficients of the random effects model rests on this assumption.
Techniques that accommodate for unobserved heterogeneity are available for
Poisson regressions. Specifically, we fit a negative binomial model to the chlorine data (also reported in Table 4 ), obtaining that the coefficient for strict liability remains positive and strongly significant. 
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D. Reporting Effect and Structural Change
In Table 5 we report the results of regressions for acids, ammonia and chlorine spills that isolate the observations from states and years with strict liability from those without it.
The null hypothesis of equal propensities to report spills in states and years with and without strict liability implies the equality of the coefficients on population density and environmental awareness. 32 The Wald test clearly rejects this null hypothesis, although it is difficult to identify a pattern for the sign and significance of the two reporting variables across the chemical families.
The Taking these differences into account, the two separate regression equations in Table 5 imply that the predicted number of spills in a year is significantly greater in states with strict liability. When differences in the actual numbers of plants are allowed for, the predicted median number of acid spills in strict liability states becomes 15.6, versus 11.9 in negligence states. This is consistent with the results of In equation (5), the coefficients of PUNDLAG and VICTLAG are negative and significant. Together, these provisions imply reductions in the number of acids spills of 20 to 26 percent. CITLAG is positive, which is against expectations, but not statistically significant.
The corresponding regression for states and years without strict liability reveals that the effects of these variables are positive, but not statistically significant.
Discussion and conclusions.
We have analyzed the patterns of spills and accidents involving chemicals in an effort to answer the question: Has strict liability encouraged firms to take care and thus reduced the number of accidents and spills? Because the predictions from the theoretical literature are ambiguous, we have turned to an empirical analysis of this issue. We have exploited the variation in the liability provisions of state superfund programs, looking for additional effects over and above those created by the federal Superfund program.
Our results vary with the chemicals analyzed. For some of these chemicals (halogenated solvents), there does not seem to be much difference in spill rates between states with and without strict liability provisions in their cleanup programs, after we account for the number of plants and for the composition of manufacturing.
For other chemicals (acids, chlorine, and ammonia) our empirical evidence suggests that small and large plants (our proxy for small and large firms) may contribute differently to spill rates, depending on whether the state's hazardous wastes policy is based on strict liability or negligence. Specifically, in states that have adopted strict liability, small firms appear responsible for a larger share of spills involving these chemicals. Since states that have adopted strict liability have, on average, more manufacturing firms, and more small firms (in absolute terms), this effect is magnified, leading to greater numbers of spills in states with strict liability laws in place.
The small-firm finding could be the result of deliberate firm decisions about their privately optimal levels of care under different liability regimes. The result may also be explained by larger firms subcontracting riskier operations to smaller, more judgementproof firms. In principle, it could also be the result of economies of scale in safety, but if that were the case there is no reason why states with and without strict liability should differ in the safety of their small firms.
In the presence of strict liability, other attributes of state cleanup programs that we believe capture the likelihood of being targeted by the state agency and the potential size of the damages also appear to affect the number of spills. Specifically, in 'strict liability'
states, state program provisions that increase firms' potential liabilities from spills or the likelihood of being targeted by the agency are associated with fewer spills and accidents.
By contrast, these attributes do not have a discernible effect in states that have not adopted strict liability in toxics regulation.
To summarize, we have found evidence that strict liability can increase the frequency of accidental releases of toxic into the environment. Further research, preferably based on firm-level data, is needed to ascertain the reasons why such effects are seen for some chemicals but not others, whether production processes are indeed shifted to smaller firms, and whether a state's adoption of strict liability is potentially endogenous with the incidence of toxic spills in that state.
APPENDIX A. Properties of chemicals.
Chlorine is a naturally occurring, greenish yellow gas with an irritating odor, or present in liquid solutions, and is used in making solvents, many chemicals, synthetic rubber, plastics, disinfectants, and chlorine bleach cleaners. Chlorine is acutely toxic to aquatic life. Chlorine dioxide is a gas with a pungent odor, and is normally diluted to less than 10% in cold solution to reduce its explosive properties. It is sold as a hydrate in frozen form and is used for bleaching wood pulp, oils, textiles and flour, and in water treatment. Both of these gases can cause irritation and severe burning of the eyes, nose, and throat, tearing, coughing and chest pain. Higher levels burn the lungs and can cause a buildup of fluid in the lungs (pulmonary edema) and death. Both gases are highly reactive and explosive in fire.
Ammonia is a highly corrosive and reactive gas that can severely irritate the lungs and burn the skin and the eyes, leading to permanent damage. It is found as a colorless gas and in water solution, and is used in making fertilizers, plastics, dyes, synthetic fibers, glues, animal foods and explosives. It is also used in the treatment and refining of metals.
METH is a colorless volatile liquid used in food, furniture and plastics processing, and in paint removers, and in degreasing and cleaning fluids. TCE is used as a solvent for degreasing and dry cleaning, and in printing inks, paints, lacquers, varnishes, and adhesives. TCA is used in making other chemicals and adhesives, and as a solvent in cleaning metal and in cleaning plastic molds. It is also used to make other organic chemicals. These halogenated solvents tend to cause unconsciousness, and irregular heart beat, and may result in death at high exposures. Long term or extremely high exposures may damage the liver and brain, and cause skin damage or burns. They are suspected carcinogens in humans, and trichloroethylene has been associated with reproductive problems. . These chemicals are subject to a variety of federal statutes (see Macauley et al., 1992) , including the Clean Air Act, which lists them as hazardous air pollutants. The National Research Council (1994) lists TCE, PERC, METH and TCE among the 25 most frequently detected substances at sites with contaminated ground water, with TCE and PERC being ranked first and third, respectively.
Cleanup of groundwater contaminated by halogenated solvents is particularly difficult. Traditional pump-and-treat techniques tend to "miss" them due to their high density and tendency to form "columns" or "fingers" that do not easily mix with the surrounding groundwater and can re-contaminate the groundwater as pumping and treatment take place (National Research Council, 1994) . Bioremediation options are also limited for this kind of solvent (National Research Council, 1993) .
The additional chlorinated solvents in the more comprehensive group of halogenated solvents have similar uses to METH, PERC, TCA and TCE.
B. Run OLS on the "augmented" regression in which the dependent variable is log spills, y it , and the independent variables are x it , z it and λ it , where λ φ δ C. Let ξ denote the square of the asymptotic t statistic for the coefficient of λ it . ξ serves as our test of endogeneity. Under the null hypothesis that σ 12 =0 ( z it is not endogenous with log spills), ξ is distributed as a chi square with one degree of freedom.
We applied this procedure to the acids and ammonia spills. We select z it to be the indicator for strict liability in the previous year, and following Alberini and Austin (1997) , we specify w it to include the lagged values of manufacturing and mining establishments with more and less than 20 employees, scores for the state water and air quality programs, measures of educational attainment of state residents, estimates of the number of hazardous waste sites in the state, state expenditure per capita, percent of state budget dedicated to environmental programs, and percent of votes for the democratic candidate in the most recent presidential elections. The vector x it includes log manufacturing and mining establishments with more and less than 20 employees, log population density, HAZWASTE, ENVORG, LAWYER3, our measure of efficiency of the state court system, and PCTDEMPR.
For the acids regression, ξ is equal to 4.71, which falls in the rejection region of the chi square with one degree of freedom, suggesting that the liability structure may be endogenous with spill events, whereas for the ammonia regression ξ is equal to 1.488, leading us to conclude that liability is not endogenous with spill events.
